NOT ONE INCH FORWARD:
The Cold War's New Hotspot(s)
World War III? Cold War II? Apocalypse I? Or forgotten two weeks from now? What exactly is happening in Ukraine?
If there is one thing students of international relations must imbibe as tenet, it is that justice is far too often a non-sequitur. Afghanistan fell to the endless bickering of Democrats and Republicans, blaming each other in a state-funded game of hot potato. China, Russia and Pakistan watched on interestedly, India and Central Asia haplessly, the Europeans followed American breadcrumbs studiously while the Afghans were forgotten in their own territory.
A similar thing might happen in Ukraine. It won’t – the West’s public handwringing is a tad obscene in its publicity – but the possibility of Ukraine being subjected to the horrors of a war started and perpetuated by the brash machismo of the United States and Russia speaks to polarity power. Kyiv is laughably conspicuous by its absence at the negotiating table that decides its fate. It’s starting to feel a lot like the 1960s, isn’t it? In an era where smartphones are more menacing than silencers, there is undoubtedly a larger game afoot. Rather than an outlier, or a desperately deluded Putinian grab at grandeur, this is the flashpoint of a resurgent Cold War.
In 2021’s On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin succinctly presents his case – Russia and Ukraine descend from Kyivan Rus. Those lands consecrated by the Byzantine – now Russian – Orthodox Church make the two nations “the same historical and spiritual space.” Of course, his assertions can be countered. Muscovy – now in Russia – supposedly had tenuous links with Kyivan Rus at best. Ukraine succumbed to a range of foreign invaders before Catherine the Great. The idea in the popular consciousness of Ukraine and Russia constituting one people finds its first mention as recently as in Soviet propaganda. But a solution will not be found in questioning the veracity of Russian beliefs, but in accepting that Russia does believe, and finding effective answers to consequential actions. In any case, if history is often used to divide, the West must find it darkly humorous that Putin is using history to unite.
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Reports of a fearful Putin have been greatly exaggerated. Ukraine is overtly courting the West, like a slew of former Soviet states immediately following the USSR’s collapse. The history of democracy in post-Soviet Ukraine is chequered but the Budapest Memorandum that saw Ukraine give up its nuclear weapons for security guarantees from the West and Russia, the Orange Revolution that denied a pro-Russian the president’s seat, and the Euromaidan Revolution that proved fatal to that same gentleman’s presidential reign are all nothing but a long-ignored people demanding their voices be heard. But this is not the nineties and Ukraine is not Poland. The nascent post-USSR Russia bit the bullet then; the big, bad democratic wolf does not keep Putin up at night now. A fully independent, democratic Ukraine can complain on the world stage, but cannot move militarily or economically against the might of Russia. So, it poses no real threat. Given that Putin considers Ukraine the red line, it is doubtful whether the West will test his resolve in a serious way by admitting Ukraine to NATO or the EU. It might seem politically incorrect to admit it, but status quo being maintained sine die could bring maximum gains for Moscow.
There is panic on the streets of London. The threat of the loss of Russian money flapping about happily in London champagne since the fall of the USSR looms large. In a sense, the United Kingdom and its confused mixture of aggression and passivity are emblematic of the befuddlement plaguing the West’s response. The United States has threatened sanctions and made a swaggering show of sending over supplies and troops to Ukraine, but seems singularly unwilling to commit to full military deployment should things come to a head. The spectacularly mismanaged pullout from Afghanistan hangs over the White House wraithlike, aching to cast incompetence upon another foreign policy manoeuver. Nevertheless, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania plod on, selling American weapons to Ukraine. Emmanuel Macron is attempting to act as the face of the Merkel-less European Union, but despite a few understanding phone calls and meetings with the opposite side, is like the feeble fleur-de-lis swinging away in the wuthering wind, unable to show commitment to certainty. Germany, meanwhile, has denied permission to Estonia to sell German weapons to Kyiv, instead sending – wait for it – helmets. A certain fiercely opposed gas pipeline might have something to do with Berlin's fence-sitting. Regardless of Qatar’s potential efforts to step up, much of Europe would be plunged into an even deeper energy crisis should Russia up and off the gas. The West is not the West, but fragmented offshoots of a once uniform idea of Western democracy, held in thrall by Chinese financial interests and Russian energy interests, and bristling at the tension between European Union centrality and state sovereignty.
For Russia, it seems as though the eternal tussle between geopolitics and economics has been settled. The proffered Putinian dream of economic stability, security and growth has, in the sanction-riddled years since 2014, given way to dreams of a resurgent Russian Empire (the now geopolitically bellicose China is in a similar situation, having swung wildly towards economic prosperity by the turn of the century). Not that economy has been totally sacrificed – oil prices are steady if not high and, with a balanced budget and a $200 billion sovereign wealth fund, the macroeconomic situation in Russia is stable. It is the microeconomic structure that remains fragile, with rising inflation and a subsequent rise in borrowing. Putin doesn’t have domestic political opposition to worry him but the Kremlin probably hopes a public reveling in a restoration of Russian glory would tolerate any economic downturns. Sanctions are scrapheap, particularly one that sees Russia being barred from SWIFT – it will continue to trade with countries like China and Iran, who ignore Western sanctions like Elon Musk ignores his investors. And states like India that maintain good relations with both sides are too strategically important for the West to not bend the rules. So the ruble will fall. But it probably will rise too.
Both sides know this. The West also knows that Putin doesn’t always live up to his portrayal of a Russian coming of Sun Tzu, but he has this time. Russia has amassed troops not for any military action against Ukraine per se, but to get ahead of the curve and bring the West to the table to discuss larger issues – NATO expansionism, Nord Stream – and to capitalise on growing rifts, particularly between EU member states. There is a larger game afoot, Watson.
Bush the Senior’s Secretary of State, James Baker, promised in the aftermath of the USSR’s collapse to move “not one inch eastward.” This proved a false promise. Russia silently accepted former Soviet states moving westward earlier but the times they are a-changing.
Almost immediately following the American response to Russia’s proposals for de-escalation, Russia announced greater military integration between itself, Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. The day before the Winter Olympics commenced in Beijing, Russia and China jointly announced a “no limits” partnership. The White House is bumbling along, desperately trying to salvage its strained relationship with the EU. Its willingness to negotiate with Iran reveals a desire to have maximum control over the Middle East, regardless of troop pullouts elsewhere. The greater acceptance of India’s foreign policy as being Indian, rather than for or against the States, shows a greater awareness of the Chinese threat.
The hard truth is that the Cold War never froze over; it merely hibernated. There are poor, unfortunate souls on both sides camped in the frigid snow, but neither side will move forward. Not one inch. Ukraine is the mere ignition for the resurgence of an old ideological conflict with new players. Russia is now partnered by China. The United States cannot rely on absolute European obedience. Emerging superpowers like India now have the confidence to take care of their own interests and deal with Russia and the States on equal terms – both sides will be accepting of this, as they will be of France striving to assert itself in Europe and Africa while playing mediator. Germany post-Merkel looks set to maintain the finest of balancing acts between pragmatism (Russia) and idealism (U.S.A.). Eastern Europe will continue to be a flashpoint for the conflict between the States and Russia. The South China Sea and the India-China and India-Pakistan borders will serve a similar function vis-à-vis China. It is looking likelier that, rather than the Roaring 20s, its grandparent in the pre-World War I era is back, but on a global rather than strictly European stage – a multitude of countries with ravenous ambition, asserting themselves loudly within the shadows of diplomatic and espionage-ridden confinement. The next big war will not be in Ukraine and it certainly will not be anytime soon. Perhaps India and China, perhaps the United States and China, but war there will be, for what is human history but a history of war?
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